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The Concept of Special Custom in International Law, 
by Anthony D’Amato,* 63 American Journal of International Law, 211-223 (1969) 
 
Abstract:  General customary international law contains rules, norms, and principles that seem applicable to any 
state and not to a particular state or an exclusive grouping of states. For example, norms relating to the high seas, 
to airspace and outer space, to diplomatic immunities, to the rules of warfare, and so forth, apply equally to all 
states having occasion to be concerned with these areas. Similarly, the facts of a given case may suggest 
exclusively the application of general custom—such as cases concerning collision on the high seas between ships 
of different countries, cases involving general principles of international law, cases turning on the construction of 
treaties under general customary canons of construction, and in general cases where the plaintiff and defendant 
states could theoretically be interchanged with any other states without affecting the content of the rules of law 
cited by either side in the dispute. By contrast, special customary international law deals with non-generalizable 
topics such as title to or rights in specific portions of  world real estate (e.g., cases of acquisitive prescription, 
boundary disputes, and so-called international servitudes), or with rules expressly limited to countries of a certain 
region (such as the law of asylum in Latin America). The line separating general from special custom is similar to 
that in English common law, where a particular custom "must apply to a definitely limited though indeterminate 
class of persons" and to a limited geographic area; if the usage is laid in too wide a geographic area, for example, it 
is taken out of the realm of custom and must be pleaded as an ordinary claim at law. 
 
Tags: Customary International Law, Special Custom in International Law, International Law, Asylum Case, Right 
of Passage Case, Norwegian Fisheries Case, Lotus Case 
 
 
 [pg211]** There are regrettably few cases in international law that go into the question 
of the proof necessary to establish a customary rule binding upon the defendant state. And from 
those few cases, notably those decided by the World Court, most writers have drawn 
pessimistic conclusions as to the proof needed for custom because of the Court's apparent 
insistence, in Professor Falk's words, upon "some tangible evidence of consent on the part of 
the state that is bound."FN1 A showing of consent is a very difficult proposition. Many legal 
disputes arise precisely because neither side has previously consented to the same rule. As 
Lauterpacht argued, to say that prior consent must be shown in order to reach a legal conclusion 
in any given international dispute is tantamount to rejecting the possibility of the existence of 
the vast majority of the rules of international law.FN2 But then, how can we explain the World 
Court's reasoning in the Asylum, Right of Passage, and Fisheries CasesFN3 in which the 
element of consent on the part of the defendant states seemed to play such a vital role in the 
Court's reasoning concerning the existence of binding rules of law?FN4 
 
 The purpose of this essay is to argue that the widely accepted view of the World Court's 
jurisprudence as emphasizing the requirement of a [pg212] showing of consent is a mistaken 
view, not because scholars have misread the cases but rather because of a widespread failure to 
draw a basic distinction between special (or "local" or “particular") customary inter-national 
law and general customary international law. The cases just cited, which shall be examined 
shortly, dealt with special, not general, custom. The stringent requirements of proof of consent 
in these cases thus do not apply to the large body of general norms of international law binding 
upon all states, but rather apply only in similar cases of “special" custom.  
 




 The distinction between special and general custom is conceptually simple. General 
customary law applies to all states, while special custom concerns relations between a smaller 
set of states. As Professor McDougal has put it, "some prescriptions are inclusive of the globe; 
other prescriptions recognize self-direction by smaller units."FN5 An analogous instance might 
be conventional international law: since no treaty to date has been signed by each and every 
state in the world, a given treaty is an explicit manifestation of consent by a group of states 
smaller than the totality of states. Professor Lissitzyn has vividly written that 
 
the "particular" international law ... created by treaty could be visualized as consisting of a vast and ever 
changing number of circles of different and often fluctuating sizes, each enclosing a special "legal 
community" composed of the parties to a treaty.FN6 
  
 General customary international law contains rules, norms, and principles that, even 
upon mere inspection, seem applicable to any state and not to a particular state or an exclusive 
grouping of states. For example, norms relating to the high seas, to airspace and outer space, to 
diplomatic immunities, to the rules of warfare, and so forth, apply equally to all states having 
occasion to be concerned with these areas. Similarly, the facts of a given case may suggest 
exclusively the application of general custom--such as cases concerning collision on the high 
seas between ships of different countries, cases involving general principles of international 
law, cases turning on the construction of treaties under general customary canons of 
construction, and in general cases where the plaintiff and defendant states could theoretically be 
interchanged with any other states without affecting the content of the rules of law cited by 
either side in the dispute. By contrast, special customary international law deals with non-
generalizable topics such as title to or rights in specific portions of [pg213] world real estate 
(e.g., cases of acquisitive prescription, boundary disputes, and so-called international 
servitudes), or with rules expressly limited to countries of a certain region (such as the law of 
asylum in Latin America). The line separating general from special custom is similar to that in 
English common law, where a particular custom "must apply to a definitely limited though 
indeterminate class of persons" and to a limited geographic area; if the usage is laid in too wide 
a geographic area, for example, it is taken out of the realm of custom and must be pleaded as an 
ordinary claim at law.FN7 
 
 The bifurcation of special and general custom is rooted in Roman law and English 
common law. As the Roman Empire expanded, centrally enacted legislation was extended in its 
applicability to outlying communities and to the peregrini (foreigners within the Empire). Such 
statutes of necessity pre-empted local law and customs to the contrary. Yet Roman law 
recognized the force of a principle known as desuetude: that the centrally enacted legislation 
could actually be canceled by virtue of lack of application and enforcement in a given 
community over a period of time.FN8 The statute stayed on the books, of course, and its 
cancellation applied only to the particular communities in which it was not enforced. This 
particular desuetude of a statute thus amounted to a negative special custom in favor of the 
relevant communities.FN9 
 
 In English common law, Blackstone summed up the historic distinction between the two 




general customs, which are the universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the common law . . . [and] 
particular customs, which, for the most part, affect only the inhabitants of particular districts.FN10  
 
The former are determinable, according to Blackstone, by the application of experience, study, 
and the following of precedents.FN11 In sharp contrast are the rules for proving special custom. 
The rules are strict, Blackstone writes, because they are (or can be) in derogation of the 
common law or general custom.FN12 Thus, special customs must be specially pleaded, must be 
proved by a jury, must have been in use a long time, must have been non-contentious, 
continuous, reasonable, certain, and internally consistent.FN13 The common law also required 
in many cases a showing of opinio juris (that the custom was observed as a matter of right) 
and that it was notorious (the defendant being expected to have [pg214] known of it).FN14 It is 
certainly clear that the vague and flexible rules given by Blackstone for the determination of 
general custom were quite unlike the difficult burdens of proof that would have to be met to 
win a case based on special custom.  
 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DISTINCTION 
 
 Many scholars, including Professor Falk cited at the beginning of this essay, have 
expressed deep pessimism about the World Court's contribution to the growth of international 
law due to the Court's alleged insistence on proof of consent before a defendant state can be 
bound. A recent strongly worded statement of this position may be found in Dr. Wilfred Jenks' 
book, The Prospects of International Adjudication. Dr. Jenks cites the World Court's statement 
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case:  
 
the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed 
any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.FN15 
 
Assuming that the Court  is dealing at this point with general custom finds in the Court’s 
language a rule of proof of custom that, in his words,  
 
may appear to verge upon the extreme positivist position that no State is bound by custom in the absence 
of proof of its own recognition of the alleged custom in deference to an opinio juris sive necessitatis. This 
position involves a frontal challenge to any possibility of  the development of international law by means 
of international adjudication.FN16  
 
Seeing no reasonable alternative to his own reading of the language of the Court in the 
Fisheries Case, Dr. Jenks proceeds to disparage the Court, the case, and international law in 
general. He labels international law "primitive," in an attempt to excuse the Fisheries 
result.FN17 Second, he suggests that decisions such as the Fisheries decision may simply have 
to be changed by states in their international practice by a good deal of law-breaking, if not 
violent, activity, since recourse to the Court is obviously a barrier to progress.FN18 Third, he 
cites long extracts from the dissenting opinions in the case, all of which take on a far harsher 
tone out of context than they might to a reader who has first read the Court's majority opinion in 
its entirety. Finally, Dr. Jenks pleads that the Court should exercise in the future much more 
discretion in matters of finding custom.FN19 He [pg215] would have the Court avoid adducing 





 It would seem that all of these alternatives proposed by Dr. Jenks would reduce, and not 
advance, his avowed purpose of promoting recourse to international adjudication. Calling 
international law "primitive" does not encourage states to seek authoritative determinations of 
the rule of law from international courts, and in any event is a completely irrelevant observation 
even if true. Suggesting that states may have to resort to force to make progress in the teeth of 
reactionary decisions such as that in the Fisheries Case is similarly unhelpful. The citation of 
long passages from dissenting opinions is a dangerous and misleading practice for any scholar 
in any legal system, for the court obviously was aware of these dissents when it reached its 
decision and usually deals with them in the way the majority opinion is organized and written. 
In context, dissents can throw light on the interpretation of the majority opinion, but out of 
context they may appear to be disjointed polemics. In international law in particular, the lack of 
compulsory jurisdiction and centralized enforcement procedures make it very difficult for an 
international tribunal to reverse itself or to depart from its own precedents in future cases, for 
most of the court's authority depends upon the soundness and consistency of its reasoning. 
Thus, dissenting opinions carry less weight in international law (unlike the Holmes-Brandeis 
dissents as predictors of changes in later American Constitutional law), and international 
scholars should accordingly refrain from citing such dissents just because they feel that the 
dissents are more persuasive than the majority opinions. Finally, Dr. Jenks' plea for more 
discretion by the Court in finding custom can hardly promote greater recourse to the Court by 
states in the future. No state wants to submit to adjudication of its disputes when the result is 
completely unpredictable, yet the greater the discretion used by the Court in finding custom the 
greater becomes the unpredictability of its decisions.  
 
 Clearly, a plea for greater discretion in the finding of customary rules of law is a step 
backward from the idea of law as a science of prediction giving nations advance notice of the 
legal propriety of their contemplated actions. Dr. Jenks' conclusions therefore reinforce the 
importance of re-reading and re-analyzing the crucial decision in the Fisheries Case and other 
key eases dealing with customary international law. The next section accordingly is an attempt 
to argue that these cases were not cases of general customary law at all, and that therefore the 
Court's insistence on a showing of consent that Dr. Jenks found so objectionable applies only to 
the limited class of similar cases of "special" custom.  
 
III. WORLD COURT CASES ON SPECIAL CUSTOM 
 
 Professor Briggs has emphasized the World Court's reasoning in the Asylum 
Case  as "admirably illustrat[ing] how international customary [pg216] law in general is 
proved," FN21 and Judge De Visscher said that the decision "fixes [the Court's] jurisprudence 
on this subject." FN22 However, the Court in that case was not dealing with customary law in 
general, but rather with special custom. One passage, quoted by many writers, contains the 
essence of the Court's reasoning. The Court began by referring to the reliance by the Colombian 
Government “on an alleged regional or local custom peculiar to Latin-American States." The 
Court then held:  
 
The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established in such a 
manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The Colombian Government must prove that the 
rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, 
and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty 
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incumbent on the territorial State. This follows from Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, which refers to 
international custom "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."FN23 
 
The Court then proceeded to find no evidence of a constant and uniform usage in the matter of 
diplomatic asylum in Latin America, due to the uncertainty, contradiction, fluctuation, 
discrepancy, and political expediency in the various cases and instances on the subject. 
Moreover, it held that Peru had "repudiated" the Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939 
(which contained the rule Colombia was contending for) by its failure to ratify those 
conventions.FN24 
 
 Since there was no proof of  “a custom of this kind," the Court denied Colombia's plea 
of  “an alleged regional or local custom.”  It is of fundamental importance to note that the Court 
used the arguments in the preceding paragraph solely with respect to this "local custom." A 
reading of what came before this section in the Court's opinion shows that the Court also 
considered matters of general custom, including treaty interpretation, yet nowhere in discussing 
those matters did the Court require a showing of the strict elements of special custom just 
quoted. For example, the Court discussed the concept of "derogation from territorial 
sovereignty" without referring to constant and uniform practice or explicit rights and 
duties.FN25 Also, in dealing with treaty interpretation, there was no reference to the strict 
elements of special custom. Rather, these elements were restricted to the section of the opinion 
where the Court explicitly dealt with ”an alleged regional or local custom" or, in other words, 
special custom.  
 
 Additional support for the preceding interpretation may be found in the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Alvarez which highlights the Court's particular concern with the matter of a 
special custom in Latin America FN26 and also in the majority opinion in the later case of the 
Nationals in Morocco. This case dealt with many separate contentions relating to [pg217] 
matters of general custom and treaty interpretation, but also with a special question of specific 
American capitulatory rights in Morocco. It was only with respect to this latter issue that the 
Court cited its earlier statement in the Asylum Case on special custom.FN27 Moreover, it 
introduced the citation by a qualification that the Court's language in the Asylum Case on this 
point dealt with "the question of the establishment of a local custom peculiar to Latin-American 
States." FN28 
 
 The portion of the Nationals in Morocco opinion dealing with capitulatory rights, by 
citing the Asylum Case on special custom, provides us with a good example of special 
customary law. For there is clearly no general rule of international law granting all states 
extraterritorial rights in other states. If among any particular states extraterritorial rights exist, 
they either stem from a treaty or from special customary practice that amounts to consent on the 
part of the territorial state. Perhaps the only general rule on the subject in present international 
law may take the form of a presumption, or pressure, against the existence of capitulatory 
rights, an "old and dying institution" in the words of Professor Verzijl.FN29 The manner in 
which the Court analyzed the rights of the parties in the Nationals in Morocco Case lends 
support to this interpretation. There was no finding of a rule of general customary law in behalf 
of the United States' claim to extraterritorial rights in Morocco. And the citation of the Asylum 
Case, with its restrictive view of the necessary elements for proving the existence of a "regional 
or local custom," indicates that with respect to certain kinds of subjects, such as capitulatory 
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rights, the plaintiff must prove in a very specific way that the defendant has expressly or 
impliedly consented to the alleged "derogation from [its] territorial sovereignty."FN30 
 
 Nor are the preceding interpretations invalidated by the Court's reference to Article 38 
in the Asylum Case, quoted previously, and again in the Nationals in Morocco Case when the 
Court quoted its own prior language. To repeat the quotation, the Court held that the elements 
of special custom follow from the reference in Article 38 of the Statute of the Court to 
international custom "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." At first impression, 
the word "general" in this clause might appear to be inconsistent with a finding of special 
custom. But historically the apparent discrepancy is easily resolved. In 1936 Professor 
Basdevant pointed out the need for a broad interpretation of Article 38 to include special 
custom.FN31 Such an interpretation was necessary in order to fulfill the reasonable 
expectations of states who often order and regularize special relationships among themselves in 
the manner discussed previously. The World Court must have agreed with Professor 
Basdevant's reasoning, even before 1936, since it has refrained entirely from mentioning Article 
[pg218] 38 in all of the numerous cases involving general custom, while mentioning it 
explicitly in the portions of the Asylum and Nationals in Morocco Cases dealing exclusively 
with special custom. In so doing, the Court has fixed upon Article 38 the broad interpretation 
called for by Professor Basdevant.  Additionally, to make the matter crystal clear, the Court 
stated in the Right of Passage Case: 
 
[I]t is objected on behalf of India that no local custom could be established between only two States. It is 
difficult to see why the number of States between which a local custom may be established on the basis of 
long practice must necessarily be larger than two. The Court sees no reason why long continued practice 
between two States accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual 
rights and obligations between  the two States.FN32 
 
Thus, to the extent that the Indian representative had contended, in pleadings that were not 
always models of clarity, that "customary international law" could not apply in this case, the 
Court set the record straight by showing, in the passage just quoted, that this was not a matter of 
general customary law affecting a large number of states but rather a matter of "local custom" 
exclusively regulating the particular rights and obligations between Portugal and India.  
 
 Let us consider this case more closely. In it the Court held that Portugal had a right of 
passage over Indian territory with respect to private persons, civil officials, and goods in 
general, for the purpose of reaching the Portuguese enclaves in India.FN33 The International 
Court's holding was based on evidence of a local custom, continuous over a period exceeding a 
century and a quarter, "accepted as law" by the parties, and constant and uniform. This case, 
according to Professor Wolfke, contains "the most decisive recognition of particular customary 
rules, as opposed to general customary rules."FN34 The Court went on to reject other alleged 
rights also on the basis of special custom. It found no special custom entitling Portugal to 
transport armed forces, police, or ammunition over Indian soil.FN35 Thus the heart of the case 
concerned special custom as the secondary rule of law-determination with respect to the bundle 
of alleged rights of passage.  
 
 An entirely new section of the Court's opinion, preceded by an asterisk break deals with 
the parties' arguments on general custom. With respect to the non-military right of passage, the 
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Court held it superfluous to inquire whether general custom would yield the same result as 
special custom. As to the alleged military right, the situation was more complex. Portugal did 
not advance any convincing arguments either in the briefs or in the oral presentation that a right 
of military access existed under general customary international law. Much of the  
argumentation consisted of analogies to municipal law granting access to private persons over 
the land of another, but these did not involve military access.  
 
 [pg219] Therefore, since the Court was able to find a distinction in the special 
customary practice between Portugal and India as to non-military and military rights, it refused 
to deal with the alleged general custom of military access. The Court noted that the situation 
was "a concrete ease having special features," that the practice between the two states was 
"clearly established," and that therefore "such a particular practice must prevail over any 
general rules."[FN36]  
 
 Thus the Court in the Right of Passage Case clearly distinguished between special 
custom and general custom in international law. However, it was not so clear as to which type 
of custom would have priority in the event of a clash. For its assertion of the primacy of special 
custom in this case was made possible largely by the absence of any convincing demonstration 
by Portugal of a general custom of military access to enclaves. Moreover, the Court would not 
have argued the superfluity of examining Portugal's contention of general custom with respect 
to non-military access if it could have disposed of this point simply by stating that special 
custom in all eases preempts general custom. It is obviously too early in international 
jurisprudence to state with any degree of conviction clear "conflict-of-law" principles with 
respect to special and general custom. The Right of Passage Case seems to suggest that when 
special custom is easily proved and general custom on the other hand is vague and dependent 
upon analogies to situations which are not directly in point, the Court will accept the former and 
not make any particular effort to inquire into the latter. This is, of course, an elusive 
relationship, to say the least, but even more elusive ones are possible. Thus, in the Nationals in 
Morocco Case, there may have been hovering in the background a rule or principle of general 
customary law to the effect that capitulatory rights are, or ought to be, construed narrowly if at 
all. This general customary prescription may have made it harder for the United States to prove 
the existence of a special custom establishing such a capitulatory regime. Conversely, it is not 
difficult to imagine a rule of general customary law that makes it easier to establish specific 
bilateral relationships. Thus, although all the instances of claim-conflicts with respect to alleged 
submarine rights on the continental shelf prior to the 1958 Geneva Convention involved 
specific parties making specific claims, the coastal state consistently had the better claim due, 
arguably, to the existence of a general rule of coastal state rights over the continental shelf that 
was simultaneously emerging.  
 
 Another possible relationship between general and special custom might be that when 
the former is too vague to cover a specific ease area (even though it could clearly apply to 
different cases), a decisive role might be played by special custom when otherwise special 
custom would not be invoked at all. This seems to have occurred in the complex case of the 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries. The Court's opinion is not easy to analyze; Douma lists over fifty 
articles devoted to the case, offering conflicting  [pg220] interpretations.FN37 The opinion is 
rambling and cryptic, possibly reflecting the fact that the judges deliberated only fifty days 
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despite the voluminous pleadings and lengthy oral arguments.FN38 It has been severely 
criticized,FN39 particularly by losing counsel.FN40 Yet if the opinion is read in its entirety, 
taking all the passages together and in context, a rational scheme becomes evident.  
 
 The most important parameter in the Court's judgment is that Norway's delimitation of 
its territorial waters must accord with general international law:  
 
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the 
will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is 
necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the 
delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international law.FN41  
 
The Court then gave three indications of the requirements of general customary international 
law in this area: (a) "the drawing of base-lines must not depart to any appreciable extent from 
the general direction of the coast";FN42 (b) if the coastline is unusually rugged, the choice of 
base-lines should be "liberally applied";FN43 and (c) as a general principle "governing any 
delimitation of the territorial sea," the "base-lines must be drawn in such a way as to respect the 
general direction of the coast and ... must be drawn in a reasonable manner."FN44 That these 
are all statements of general customary rules is evident from the fact that the Court simply takes 
judicial notice of them, with no attempt to offer independent proof. It is moreover important to 
note that, although the statements may not offer precise guidelines in close cases, they certainly 
rule out arbitrary and excessive claims and thus serve the function of any general rule of law in 
indicating broad standards of permissible conduct.  
 
 The opinion also contains statements of general custom for which the Court does offer 
or allude to evidence of state practice. An example is the statement that for the purpose of 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea "it is the low-water mark .... which has generally 
been adopted in the practice of States."FN45 There are also instances of alleged general rules 
which the Court found not to be accurate statements of international law. The most important 
example of this was Great Britain's claim that, to be considered as internal waters, a "bay" may 
not have, under general customary law, a closing line of its indentation that exceeds ten sea 
miles. But the Court held that  
 
[pg221] although the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in their national law and in 
their treaties and conventions, and although certain arbitral decisions have applied it as between these 
States, other States have adopted a different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the 
authority of a general rule of international law.FN46 
 
 It is within the parameters of the preceding formulations of general customary law that 
the Court considers matters of special custom. One large class of instances of special custom 
occurring in different places throughout the opinion is the matter of "historic waters." These 
are, of course, instances of prescription. As Judge Fitzmaurice has analyzed the matter,  
 
the acquisition of a historic right by prescriptive means is merely a special case of the creation of right by 
custom or usage.FN47 
 




the element of consent, that is to say, acquiescence with full knowledge, on the part of the [complaining] 
State is not only present, but necessary, to the formation of the right."FN48 
 
Indeed, Great Britain did not contest the validity of prescriptive rights, conceding that the 
"historic waters" belonged to Norway if possessio longi temporis was proven in each 
instance.FN49 
 
 Some other examples of special custom in the Court's opinion have caused considerable 
trouble for critics of the case who have not distinguished between the two types of custom. 
First, we have already seen that the Court rejected the ten-mile rule for bays as far as general 
customary law was concerned. But then the Court added an argument addressed specifically to 
the two parties in the litigation:  
 
In any event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has 
always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.FN50 
 
In short, the Court considered the ten-mile rule both in general and in special custom. It upheld 
Norway on the general ground because of the division of state practice throughout the world. 
And it upheld Norway on the special ground because, as between Norway and Great Britain, 
Norway had not consented to the practice (indeed she opposed it). Here the Court was in effect 
saying that Norway's delimitation of bays was not unreasonable in light of general customary 
practice, and therefore Great Britain could not limit Norway's rights within the ambit of 
reasonableness unless Norway consented to the establishment of such a special custom.  
 
 [pg222] But if Norway has certain rights within the ambit of reasonableness, Great 
Britain may also have similar rights. For if a certain area is contested, one cannot say a priori 
that the coastal state and not the state that is attempting to fish in the area has the better 
preemptive claim to whatever may reasonably be claimed. Thus it became relevant to see if 
Great Britain had consented or acquiesced to Norway's use of any part of the area defined by 
the general customary rules previously stated by the Court. Thus, as a second example of 
special custom, and with respect to the questions of the ten-mile rule, the historic waters, and 
their applications to the “skjaergaard” and other specific configurations of the Norwegian 
coast, the Court took specific account of the notoriety of the Norwegian claims and the failure 
of Great Britain to engage in substantial protest:  
 
 The Court notes that in respect of a situation which could only be strengthened with the passage 
of time, the United Kingdom Government refrained from formulating reservations.  
 The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the international community, Great Britain's 
position in the North Sea, her own interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention would in any 
case warrant Norway's enforcement of her system against the United Kingdom.FN51 
 
This language, coming near the end of the Court's opinion, points up the Court's concern for the 
special aspects of the bilateral relationship between Norway and the United Kingdom.FN52 It 
would be a mistake to apply to general custom the Court's reasoning on toleration and lack of 
protest, for these served a specific purpose relating to consent in the matter of special customary 





 To round out the practice of the World Court, two additional cases, other than those 
dealing with acquisitive prescription,FN53 may be briefly mentioned. In 1927 the Court dealt 
with the question whether the European Commission of the Danube had jurisdictional powers 
over navigation of the river from Galatz to above Braila.FN54 The Court looked to "usage 
[pg223] having juridical force simply because it has grown up and been consistently applied 
with the unanimous consent of all the States concerned."FN55 This was clearly a matter of 
special custom, inasmuch as the case was about a specific commission for a specific river; no 
one has ever suggested the existence of a general rule setting up river commissions and giving 
them precise jurisdictional powers. Hence the idea of "unanimous consent" was restricted to a 
situation of special custom. Similarly, in 1930 the Court delivered an advisory opinion 
concerning a specific place—the Free City of Danzig. It based its holding that Poland did not 
have absolute rights regarding the conduct of the foreign relations of Danzig on a  
 
practice which seems now to be well understood by both Parties ... [that] gradually emerged from the 
decisions of the High Commissioner and from subsequent understandings and agreements arrived at 
between the Parties under the auspices of the League.FN56 
 
Again, the attempt to show consent was necessary in a situation of special custom. 
 
 The cases just examined do not afford a complete picture of the requirements for 
proving special custom in international law. Indeed, it is possible that the requirements may 
change, depending upon the type of case involved—whether it is a case of prescription, or 
boundaries, or regional law, or whatever.FN57 In this area, as in so many others in international 
law, the richest collection of evidence—diplomatic correspondence among nations—has hardly 
begun to be tapped in any systematic way. New methods in the social sciences, particularly the 
content analysis of documents FN58 combined with statistical factor analysis of the relevant 
components of decision and conflict resolution,FN59 may offer a way to mine these resources 
of state practice.  
 
 But apart from the problem of the refinement of criteria for special custom, the most 
significant conclusion to draw from the preceding analysis is that special custom should be 
sharply distinguished from general customary law. The particular problems of proving consent 
on the part of the defendant state in any claim-conflict situation that are associated with a claim 
of special custom need not be extended to the broader question of norms of general custom, at 
least insofar as the World Court's cases are concerned. An important analytical step forward can 
be taken if the problem of the proof of general custom is seen to be an entirely separate question 
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